

Espionage and the Ecclesia

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"Did you read *Zorba the Greek*? Then you know about the Devil himself being inside the monastery. It is so with us. In Alba Julia, for example, the confession stall in the church was bugged." (Romanian author Sandra Danciu)¹

Of all the realms of human activity where church and state may interact and intersect, the world of espionage is one of the murkiest. Religion—the task of enlightening the world with the knowledge of God—would seem to have little in common with intelligence work, which thrives on deception and deceit. The use of religious personnel—clergymen, missionaries, and aid workers—as agents by intelligence agencies raises a number of serious legal and ethical questions. These questions have renewed significance after the June 2000 arrest of George Trofimoff, the highest-ranking United States military officer ever to be charged with espionage, since Trofimoff was both recruited for the KGB and subsequently “handled” in his spying activities by an Orthodox priest, Rev. Igor V. Susemihl, himself a KGB agent.² Do governments have an obligation not to draw religious organizations into espionage activities? Does cooperation with or active employment by an intelligence agency contradict a person’s religious vocation and mission? This essay will seek to address some of these issues.

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1. Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: First Vintage Departure Edition, 1994), 155.

2. Trofimoff delivered classified materials to Susemihl and often received payments from him in return. In its indictment of Trofimoff, the Justice Department noted that the KGB “routinely exploited the Russian Orthodox Church and its officials, including clergy,” in intelligence operations. One former KGB officer, Oleg Kalugin, who alluded to Susemihl and Trofimoff in his 1994 work, *The First Directorate*, commented that “the priest’s help in spotting a potential recruit is precisely the reason we in the KGB wanted agents inside the church.” Cf. Vernon Loeb, “Retired Army Colonel Accused As Spy,” *The Washington Post*, 15 June 2000, A25; Tamara Lytle, “Viera Retiree is Accused of Espionage,” *Orlando Sentinel*, 15 June 2000 (on-line edition at <http://orlandosentinel.com/automagic/news/2000-06-15/NWSSPY15061500.html>); and Larry Hobbs, “Ex-KGB Officer’s Book Is Evidence,” *Associated Press* (Wire service report, 6-15-00, 1748 EDT).

APOSTLES OR AGENTS?

On 22 June 1941, Father Walter J. Cizek, an American-born Jesuit priest, was arrested by the Soviet secret police at a lumber camp in the Ural mountains on charges of being a spy, charges that ultimately led to a fifteen-year sentence in Siberian exile. In his autobiography, *With God in Russia*, Cizek described his inability to convince his interrogator, Aleksandr Sedov, that his interest in coming into the USSR was merely pastoral and had no connection to espionage:

I tried my best to explain that my mission from the Metropolitan³ was the same as any other parish priest or missionary: to serve the people. I was their spiritual minister, pure and simple; no politics whatsoever were involved. Sedov couldn't see it, anymore than any other interrogator had been able to understand it. They had always insisted, as he insisted, that the priestly mission was simply a pretext for some political mission. . . . Again the eternal questioning about why I wanted to go to the Urals. And again I tried to explain that many of the Ukrainians and White Russians who had been a part of my flock at Albertin or the Archbishop's diocese in Lvov, had volunteered to work in the Urals, and as a priest, I wanted to be with them and minister to them. At the root of Sedov's interest and insistence was the fact that the area around the Urals was one of the major industrial centers for the Soviet war effort. My interrogators, therefore, were convinced that my choice of the Urals perhaps had something to do with sabotage. . . . Tired of the subject as I was, I was equally dogged in insisting that my only motives for entering Russia, or going anywhere in Russia—no matter where—had been purely spiritual ones, like those of priests anywhere.⁴

Unfortunately for Cizek, his Soviet interrogators were well aware that not all clergymen, priests, or church workers (or people claiming to be such persons) were guided by "purely spiritual" motives in their actions, especially since the Soviets themselves were trying to cloak intelligence operations using the cover of the cloth. Another Roman Catholic priest, who served in a World War II partisan unit as a medical doctor, found himself in a position to observe a number of Soviet operations in Eastern Europe during and immediately after the war. He wrote:

In Prague in 1946 I recognized an MVD agent whom I had known in Russia; when I inquired about him, I learned he was the secretary of the Russian Orthodox bishop there. It is not pleasant to have to doubt the good faith of men who come from Russia or its satellite countries wearing clerical garb. Yet it would be naive to ignore the fact that some of them are agents. In 1947, two Hungarian "priests" traveled across the United States, lecturing in favor of a greater collaboration of the West with Russia. It was only when the suspicions of a Wisconsin bishop had been aroused that the truth came out: they were Communist agents, never or-

3. He is referring to Andrei Shepticki, the Eastern-Rite Catholic Metropolitan of Lvov in interwar Poland, who had sent Cizek and another Jesuit to the Urals to minister to Catholics who had been taken there by the Soviets to work.

4. Walter J. Cizek, S.J., *With God in Russia* (New York: Image Books, 1966), 96-97.

ained, using the passports of two authentic priests who had died in a Russian concentration camp.⁵

The special deference accorded to religion in many societies around the world has made it very tempting for intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Soviet-era Committee for State Security (KGB), to employ religious figures as agents and to use religious organizations as cover for espionage activities. By virtue of their offices, clergymen often enjoy a position of respect and trust in society.⁶ Missionaries and aid workers usually have the ability to travel into areas off-limits to others. Religious institutions sometimes enjoy a privileged position excepting them from direct government scrutiny, especially from law-enforcement organs.⁷ As a result, intelligence agencies have worked with religious institutions and church workers in a variety of operations. These have included:

1) Gathering of Information

Through their travels, pastoral visits, and ministry, clergymen and religious workers are often well-suited to collect information. In many cases, this does not entail any sort of "illegal" or clandestine activity, but is simply passing along what one has seen and heard in the course of one's movements and conversations (and the clergyman or religious worker may not even be aware that his interrogator is in fact an intelligence agent). Fr. Cizsek, prior to his return to the United States, was approached by the KGB with vague proposals of this nature. As he put it, "They wouldn't exactly want me to spy . . . but it would 'be nice' if I reported my 'impressions.'"⁸ Reportedly, Eastern Orthodox clergymen who would travel to the Soviet bloc would be debriefed following their return to the United States by members of the American intelligence community, not for information regarding strategic missile programs or other classified material, but simply to provide background information

5. *God's Underground*, by "Father George" as told to Gretta Palmer (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), 248-49.

6. This was just as true in the Middle Ages as in modern times. Concerns about the position of the clergy being misused for purposes of espionage were among the reasons cited by Grand Duke Basil II of Moscow in a letter to the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1441, asking that the head of the Orthodox Church in Russia be elected locally rather than appointed in Constantinople. Dimitri Obolensky, *Byzantium and the Slavs* (New York: St. Vladimir's Press, 1994), 184.

7. Following the terrorist truck-bombings of the U. S. Embassy in Lebanon, Israeli intelligence located a number of sites that were being used to organize and equip terrorist attacks. While retaliatory raids were launched against a number of these locations, one target, a mosque that was believed to be the place where car bombs were being assembled, was designated "off-limits" because of its role as a shrine and holy place. Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987* (New York: Pocket Books, 1988), 321.

8. Cizsek, *With God in Russia*, 335.

on the places and people visited.⁹ Similarly, during World War II, the White House turned to Francis Cardinal Spellman, archbishop of New York, for help in providing information and making contacts, because, "as a ranking churchman, he could visit the Vatican frequently and possibly enter nations where American diplomats could not."¹⁰ Because of his prominent role in the Catholic Church, not simply as an archpastor, but as a major international fundraiser and confidant and advisor to the pope, Spellman had access to a great deal of sensitive information. The reports prepared by his chancery staff on various international events and crises were often shared by the cardinal with U. S. diplomatic and intelligence officials.¹¹ In 1946, the primate of Hungary, Josef Cardinal Mindszenty, used his position to pass along to Western intelligence information he had collected on Hungarian and Soviet activities in Eastern Europe, including minutes of cabinet meetings in Budapest.¹²

In some cases, the religious organization might not be a willing participant. The so-called "Mitrokhin Dossier" indicates that the KGB sought to penetrate the Vatican diplomatic service because the Roman Catholic Church was able "to collect sensitive information from all over the world" both through the recruitment of willing agents but also by deceiving people who might not have been aware that they were passing along intelligence to the KGB.¹³

Sometimes, religious organizations have not only been asked to collect information but to act as an intermediary to facilitate introductions between intelligence agencies and promising contacts or agents. The CIA used Cardinal Spellman as an intermediary to gain access to the head of the Catholic Church in Guatemala, Archbishop Mariano Rosell Arellano, in the early 1950s; through the medium of the church, U.S. intelligence was able to make contacts with disaffected members of the Guatemalan military, laying the basis for the 1954 coup. Similarly, Ngo Dinh Diem, later to become the U.S.-backed leader of South Vietnam, was first introduced to American governmental circles by the Rev. Edwin Walsh, S.J. (then dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service) and the Rt. Rev. Howard Carroll.¹⁴

9. As noted by Professor Dimitry Pospelovsky, at a forum to discuss allegations of cooperation between Orthodox leaders and the KGB, held 22 March 1992, at St. John the Baptist Russian Orthodox Church, Washington, D.C.

10. John Cooney, *The American Pope: The Life and Times of Cardinal Spellman* (New York: Times Books, 1984), 124.

11. *Ibid.*, 124.

12. *Ibid.*, 164.

13. "Infiltration of Vatican Was Top KGB Priority," *Daily Catholic* 10, no. 195 (13 October 1999) (internet edition, at <http://www.dailycatholic.org/issue/oct13dc2.htm>).

14. Cooney, *The American Pope*, 231, 234-35, 241.

2) "Influence" and Disinformation Operations

The pulpit is one of the ways in which religion makes its influence felt in larger society. Ministers can play a critical role in shaping public opinion or in providing advice to leaders.

A number of Muslim activists contend, for example, that the British government helped to support and fund the missionary activities of the Ahmadiyya movement, a breakaway Muslim sect that many mainstream Muslims believe is heretical, in India and in other Muslim areas of the British Empire, because the Ahmadiyyites, from the pulpit, preached about the need for loyalty to and support of the British and were used to divide and weaken Muslim communities. Ahmadiyya preachers maintained that the British government was "just" and that there were no grounds for *jihad* or any sort of struggle against it.¹⁵

Being able to shape worldwide Christian opinion in a more positive direction towards the Soviet Union (and thus affect Western policy towards the USSR), through infiltration of ecumenical bodies and the Vatican, was a key priority of the KGB.¹⁶ By influencing the scope and direction of the World Council of Churches, the KGB hoped to deflect criticism of the USSR while using the moral authority of the WCC to attack the policies of Western states.¹⁷ In recently published files of the Estonian KGB, the cooperation of the current Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, Aleksii II (Ridiger), in these areas, is noted. Code-named "Drozdov," the KGB report concludes: "After securing of the agent in practical work, we intend to also use him in furtherance of our interests by sending him to capitalist states as part of Church delegations."¹⁸

The Catholic Church worked closely with the CIA in post-war Italy to prevent the Communist Party from winning at the polls. The United States government released large sums of so-called "black currency" (untraceable funds largely derived from confiscated Nazi assets) to the Vatican for the support of anti-Communist parties and to support appeals made by Catholic leaders against the Communist Party. The

15. The "Anti-Ahmadiyya Movement" is based in the United Arab Emirates and is chaired by Syed Mahfooz Ali. The allegations made against the Ahmadiyya movement were posted by Dr. Syed Rashid Ali, especially in two essays, "An Outgrowth of Imperialism," 21 January 1999 (http://alhafiez.org/rashid/british-jewish/bjc_1.htm) and "Underworld of Spies," 27 February 1999 (http://alhafiez.org/rashid/british-jewish/bjc_13.htm).

16. "Activist Priest Discusses KGB Involvement With the Russian Orthodox Church," press release of the Washington Office of the Congress of Russian-Americans, 20 March 1992.

17. Stephen Brown, "Cold War study claims WCC was 'infiltrated' by communist agents," *ENI Bulletin*, no. 2, 9 February 2000, 15-17.

18. Open Letter of Rev. Georgi Edelshtein, 1 February 2000, archived at <http://www.orthodoxnews.com/stories/letters2042000004241.shtml>.

Communist party was denounced from pulpits and a vigorous campaign was undertaken by the church to dissuade Italian Catholics from supporting Communist candidates.¹⁹

In Guatemala, the CIA worked closely with Catholic leaders to undermine the leftist regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. In 1954, a pastoral letter was issued calling on all Guatemalans to "rise as a single man against the enemy of God and country." With CIA assistance, this missive was distributed to all corners of Guatemala and given a great deal of publicity.²⁰

Not all such operations take place with the knowledge or approval of religious authorities. When the Catholic Church emerged as a critic of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, the CIA sought to provide funding to the church under the rubric of "anti-communist propaganda" through the medium of a private U.S. foundation in order to disguise the actual source of the money. The plan was so designed so the Archbishop of Managua, Miguel Obando Bravo, would not be compromised by knowingly accepting money from the CIA. However, after Senator Daniel P. Moynihan and others on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence protested, the plan was cancelled for fear that exposure would hopelessly compromise the Catholic Church of Nicaragua.²¹

3) Couriers

International religious organizations, particularly those with well-developed communications and transport networks, can often provide invaluable services to intelligence agencies by giving them an alternate means to transport funds, personnel, and goods, thus bypassing normal channels.

In 1974, the Eastern-Rite (Melkite) Catholic archbishop of Jerusalem, Hilarion Capucci, was arrested by Israeli authorities for using his church-registered vehicle as a means to smuggle weapons to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).²² During the early 1980s, the CIA used Catholic intermediaries to funnel funds to the "Solidarity" trade union in Poland, until concerns were raised about the political risk involved (the operation was terminated in 1984).²³ In September 1999, three Americans—John Dixon, Gary Blanchard, and Joseph Pettijohn, of Harvest Field Ministries—were sentenced to prison terms in

19. Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War* (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), 91-92.

20. Cooney, *The American Pope*, 234.

21. Woodward, *Veil*, 427-28.

22. "News Briefs," *Middle East Digest*, July 1997 (<http://www.cdn-friends-icej.ca/medigest/jul97/briefs.html>).

23. Woodward, *Veil*, 428.

Zimbabwe on charges of arms smuggling to rebels intent on overthrowing the government of Laurent Kabila in the Congo. The men were initially detained after a handgun was discovered as they attempted to pass through airport security; a search of their luggage and vehicle turned up shotguns, rifles, telescopic sights, radios, ammunition, a machine gun, and silencers. While they claimed to possess this arsenal for self-protection while engaging in mission and relief work in the Congo, High Court Justice Ismael Adams declared that he did not believe the accused had provided any reasonable explanation for having the weapons.²⁴

The most infamous collaboration between a religious body and an intelligence agency was the so-called "Ratlines" after the Second World War, by which ex-Nazis and quisling collaborators who were of use to American intelligence because of their anti-communist background, were funneled out of Europe to new lives and identities in the United States, Latin America, or Australia. The U. S. Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) maintained a working relationship with Monsignor Krunoslav Dragonovic "to run special ratlines out of Europe for U.S.-sponsored intelligence assets who were too 'hot' to have any official connection with the U.S. government."²⁵ These people received sanctuary in monasteries and church institutions and were provided with new identities and papers. By using their influence with various governments, clerics like Monsignor Dragonovic or Archbishop Ivan Buchko were able to call off police pursuits and secure visas for the safe passage and resettlement of these individuals.²⁶

4) Active Measures

In some cases, the connections between faith-based organizations and intelligence services have moved beyond cooperation to the point where the religious mission is subordinated to the secular purpose of engaging in espionage. The relief efforts of Dr. Thomas A. Dooley III are a case in point. Dooley's work, first in Vietnam and then in Laos,

24. "US 'missionaries' sentenced," BBC News Online, 13 September 1999, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/low/english/world/africa/newsid_445000/445801.stm; and Odhiambo Okite, "Missionaries or Mercenaries," *Christianity Today* 43, 24 May 1999, 28. The *Zimbabwe Independent*, in investigating this story, believes that while the three men may have been set up as scapegoats for charges of terrorism, it did conclude: "With their huge arsenal and cross-border itinerary it is natural that we should be suspicious of the intention of the three Americans. At first glance they don't look much like missionaries. They could be a number of things including most obviously gunrunners." "State Propaganda and American 'Saboteurs,'" *The Zimbabwe Independent*, 19 March 1999. On-line edition at http://www.africa.news.org/south/zimbabwe/stories/19990319_feat12.html.

25. Simpson, *Blowback*, 185.

26. *Ibid.*, 176-98.

provided excellent cover for a number of intelligence operations. The evacuation and resettlement of Catholic refugees from North Vietnam helped to destabilize the regime of Ho Chi Minh and provide a basis of support for Ngo Dinh Diem in the south. Dooley's book and lecture tours were funded by the CIA to help with propaganda operations. Relief work in Laos enabled the United States to gather intelligence, particularly along the sensitive Laotian-Chinese border, to track movements of men and supplies, and provide excellent cover for the insertion of Special Forces and other intelligence operatives under the guise of civilian medical workers.²⁷ Another excellent example was the creation of anti-communist fighting units. Monsignor Don Giuseppe Bicchierai of Milan received funding from the American government to recruit, equip, and arm an anti-communist unit in Italy to harass leftists and communists; his armed formation became the model for other such units created and sponsored by Western intelligence elsewhere in Southern Europe.²⁸

The legacy of church-state collaboration in the intelligence and espionage fields has often proven to be very damaging to the credibility of religious organizations. The fear that a person might be using religion as cover for more nefarious activities led the Colombian government to forbid any contact between some of the most notorious members of the Cali drug smuggling cartel with a nun involved in prison ministry; she was not even permitted to speak to them from a distance. Commenting on this, she noted, "They [prison authorities] may think we are spies who are here to check on them [the cartel prisoners]."²⁹ In the trial of one Catholic nun in China during the 1950s, for example, the missionary worker was held to be an intelligence officer because of her affiliation to a religious organization: "You confess to Maryknoll. That is an espionage ring. You are a spy."³⁰ Ultimately, the People's Republic of China decided to expel all foreign missionaries and require that all religious organizations in China sever their administrative ties with overseas co-religionists; Article 36, paragraph 4 of the Chinese constitution states, "Religious bodies and religious affairs

27. Arthur Suppo, "The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley: A Cautionary Tale," *St Catherine Review* (July/August 1999): 1-5 (archived at <http://www.aquinas-multimedia.com/catherine/dooley.html>); Fred Clarkson, "Behind the Supply Lines," *Covert Action Information Bulletin* 25 (Winter 1986) (note referenced at <http://www.pir.org/gw/dooley.txt>); Cooney, *The American Pope*, 243.

28. Simpson, *Blowback*, 94.

29. "Prison Housing Cartel Bosses Said 'Most Secure' in World," Santa Fe de Bogota Emisoras Caracol radio broadcast, 3 July 1996, cited in FBIS Daily Report *Latin America*, FBIS-TDD-96-022-L, 3 July 1996.

30. "The Crimes of Mok Koo Niong," *Mission to Mankind*, ed. Frederick A. McGuire, C. M. (New York: Random House, 1963), 165.

are not subject to any foreign domination.”³¹ In some cases, the perceived identification of church workers with espionage agencies has proven fatal. In March 1981, Chester A. Bitterman, a Bible translator and mission worker in Colombia, was killed by leftist guerillas who were convinced that his “attempt to spread religious literature in the languages of Indian peasants was a propaganda ploy of the Central Intelligence Agency.”³² This is why Pieter Vermeulen, himself a Baptist missionary from South Africa, noted that religious groups should try to use indigenous personnel as often as possible: “They are less likely to be accused of being a ‘foreign agent,’ ‘spy,’ or ‘outsider.’”³³

The Soviet-era ties between religious personnel and the intelligence organs continue to plague the post-Soviet religious establishment. In January 2000, Patriarch Filaret of the breakaway Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate, himself identified as a Soviet-era KGB operative,³⁴ accused the leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate of “collaborating with law enforcement bodies” and other state organs to the detriment of other religious groups in the country.³⁵ In that same month, Palestinian officials seized control of a monastery in Jericho that had been under the control of an emigre Russian Orthodox organization (“The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad”) and turned the property over to representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. In resisting the transfer of the property, one of the nuns of the of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad charged that the Moscow Patriarchate, because of its close ties with the old Soviet regime (and because of the alleged collaboration of the current Patriarch, Aleksii II, with the KGB), was going to turn the monastery property over to the Russian government to set up a consulate (and by extension, a listening post for Russian intelligence).³⁶

Similarly, officials in the Russian government have expressed concern that foreign missionaries and charitable aid workers may be connected to Western intelligence. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) warned that spies might “pose as missionaries” to gain access to

31. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China is archived at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ch00000_.html.

32. James Mann, “Clergy Caught in Latin American Cross Fire,” *U. S. News and World Report*, 20 April 1981, 59.

33. Pieter Vermeulen, “Why Indigenous Missionaries are Better,” *Christian Mission* 2 (1997): 4, archived at <http://christianaid.org/972pg4.htm>.

34. “Open Letter of Father Georgi Edelshtein,” n. 18.

35. “Rival Patriarchs Squabble over Churches,” *FBIS Daily Report: Central Eurasia* (online edition), FBIS-SOV-2000-0113, 13 January 2000.

36. “Statement of Sister Maria Stephanopoulos,” 1 February 2000. Archived at *Orthodox News*, at <http://www.orthodoxnews.com/stories/letters2042000004241.shtml>.

Russian military facilities. In 1998, these fears were highlighted after the detention of Mormon missionaries, first in Saratov, and then in Krasnoyarsk, who had been accused of "illegally entering the premises of a military unit."³⁷ The Mormons, in particular, are vulnerable to the charge of espionage because of, among other things, published reports in the United States that highlighted the desirability of recruiting Mormons into the CIA (albeit AFTER the completion of their missionary tours) on the grounds of their foreign travel and language experience, as well as increased interest in American intelligence circles of placing agents under "non-official cover" (NOC).³⁸ In January 2000, a new Russian national security policy (Edict E-24) promulgated by the administration of acting President Vladimir Putin identified the "cultural-religious expansion" of neighboring states onto Russian territory as a threat "to the national security and interests of the Russian Federation" and called for the state to take active measures to counteract "the negative influence of foreign religious organizations and missionaries."³⁹ For all of these reasons, most American missionary and charitable agencies have a vested interest in ensuring that "their work on foreign soil be kept arm's length" from the activities of the United States government, to prevent any association of their individual missions with the operations of American intelligence, to the point of not even working with the State Department to facilitate the release of workers or personnel who have been kidnapped or detained.⁴⁰

SHOULD GOD'S SERVANTS SPY FOR CAESAR?

The question as to whether clergymen and other religious workers should serve as intelligence agents is more properly two questions: first, should religious and charitable workers knowingly volunteer or be recruited as agents, and second, should espionage organs involve such people in intelligence work without their knowledge or consent?⁴¹ The

37. "Missionaries Labeled Spies," *RFE/RL NewsLine*, 27 October 1998 (on-line edition: <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/10/271098.html>), 4.

38. Douglas Waller, "The CIA's Next Generation," *Newsweek*, 17 February 1992, 27.

39. "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 14 January 2000. Reprinted in *Russia Religion News*, January 2000, at <http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0001b.html>; see also Yakov Krotov, "State Security as National Idea," *Obshchaia Gazeta*, 27 January 2000, 1.

40. Mindy Belz, "At Your Own Risk," *World* (on-line edition) 11, no. 15 (31 August 1996) at http://www.worldmag.com/world/issue/8-31-96/international_1.asp.

41. Drawing here upon the distinction made by Rev. Gleb Yakunin in 1992, that while an agent is someone who willingly undertakes espionage or intelligence work, with full knowledge of the implications of his or her actions, other people might be unwittingly involved in intelligence operations through the conscious manipulations of others. See "Activist Priest," n. 16.

initial, public response to both questions has generally been in the negative.

Concern over the ways in which church and charitable organizations had been used in espionage work came out in testimony to Congressional committees in 1975 and 1976. Whereas the Church Committee (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities) recommended strict limits on the involvement of clergy, academics, and journalists in intelligence activities, the Pike Committee (House Select Committee on Intelligence) advocated a complete ban on any intelligence agency providing funds to religious or educational institutions.⁴² This led to a November 1977 directive that prohibited the CIA from engaging in any sort of activity "with any U. S. clergy or missionary, whether or not ordained, who is sent out by a mission or church organization to preach, teach, heal, or proselytize."⁴³ This took the form of an internal directive, approved by the attorney general, and remains in operation.⁴⁴ Similarly, revelations about the cooperation between religious groups and the KGB in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union prompted the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to pass legislation in 1992 forbidding the recruitment of church personnel by the organs of state security.⁴⁵

However, such prohibitions have not been absolute. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has the authority to issue a waiver to allow the use of clergy (or journalists or Peace Corps workers, who are also "protected" categories) in intelligence operations. In 1996, CIA Director John Deutsch indicated that he had issued classified guidelines setting out specific tests that would have to be met to justify the use of clergy or journalists in espionage or intelligence-gathering. According to these guidelines, the DCI must notify the president, the national security advisor, and the relevant congressional committees. Deutsch testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in July 1996 that, after more than a year's service, he had not had rea-

42. Richard A. Best and Herbert Andrew Boerstling, *Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-1996* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1996), 24, 26; contained as Appendix C of the Staff Study of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (104th Congress), "The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century."

43. Mindy Belz, "Missionary: possible," *World* (on-line edition) 11, no. 15 (31 August 1996) at http://www.worldmag.com/world/issue/8-31-96/international_2.asp.

44. Chapter Fourteen, "Accountability and Oversight," in the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*, 1 March 1996, at <http://www.gpo.gov/int/int019.html>.

45. See "Activist Priest," n. 16.

son to waive the regulations prohibiting use of clerics, missionaries, journalists, or humanitarian workers in intelligence work. Robert Gates, Deputy Director of the CIA during the Reagan Administration and DCI from November 1991 to January 1993, stated that during his career he could only recall a few waivers being issued, in cases involving "extreme danger" to U. S. citizens, while Admiral Stansfield Turner, DCI during the Carter Administration (1977-1981), acknowledged that he had issued waivers to permit three journalists to serve as agents.⁴⁶ Moreover, even existing bans did not always preclude voluntary cooperation on the part of clergymen with intelligence agencies.⁴⁷

It was the publication of a Council of Foreign Relations report in 1996 that helped to draw this issue back into the limelight. In their section on "Clandestine Activities," members of the panel concluded:

Clandestine operations for whatever purpose currently are circumscribed by a number of legal and policy constraints. These deserve review to avoid diminishing the potential contribution of this instrument. At a minimum, the Task Force recommended that a fresh look be taken at limits on the use of nonofficial "covers" for hiding and protecting those involved in clandestine activities.⁴⁸

This reopened the debate. The Select Committee on Senate Intelligence first raised the issue with then CIA Director John Deutsch on 22 February 1996, at which time the DCI indicated that he saw no reason to make any change since existing policy gave him the authority to authorize waivers to the prohibition. A more detailed hearing on the subject was held on 17 July 1996, drawing in religious and missionary figures such as Dr. John Orme, Executive Director of the International Foreign Mission Association; Dr. Don Argue, President of the National Association of Evangelicals; Sister Claudette La Verdiere, President of the Maryknoll Sisters; and Dr. Rodney Page, Deputy General Secretary of Church World Service.⁴⁹

DCI Deutsch laid out his arguments in favor of a limited and circumscribed role for clergy in American intelligence operations, stating: As I told the Committee when this issue was raised with me [on February 22nd], my sympathy is on the side of no intelligence use of American journalists or clergy. I strongly believe in the independence of our free press and in the division be-

46. "CIA Chief Won't Rule Out Using Reporters," *Reuters*, 18 July 1996; Jono Fischback, "With a Little Bit of Heart and Soul: Analyzing the Role of HUMINT in the Post Cold War Era," paper delivered at the Woodrow Wilson School Policy Conference 401a, 6 January 1997 (at <http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/snyder/humint.htm>).

47. "The CIA's use of journalists, clergy, and Peace Corps: Notes from 17 July 1996 hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee." Collected by a staffer for the Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C., and posted on-line at http://www.us.net/cip/sen_intl.htm.

48. *Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U. S. Intelligence* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), on line edition, <http://www.fas.org/irp/cfr.html>.

49. *Special Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, January 4, 1995 to October 3, 1996* (105th Congress, 1st session), 24.

tween government and the church. That is why I have stated publicly that I have no intention of using either American journalists or clergy for intelligence purposes. Further, as this Committee knows, I have found no circumstances while Director of Central Intelligence that would cause me to do either.

But, Mr. Chairman, as the Director of Central Intelligence I must be in a position to assure the President and the members of his National Security Council that there will never come a time when the United States cannot ask a willing citizen to assist in combating an extreme threat to the nation. So, I, like my predecessors, have arrived at the conclusion that the Agency should not be prohibited from considering the use of American journalists or clergy. I am able to imagine particular circumstances, Mr. Chairman, in which the lives of American hostages depended upon particular knowledge only a journalist might have or obtain. I can foresee the possibility of a terrorist group attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction in a crowded urban area and where both the President and the nation would look to the Agency to use all possible means to detect and deter such an event. Under each of those scenarios, I believe it unreasonable to foreclose the witting use of any likely source of information.⁵⁰

On 21 August 1996, Senator Bob Kerrey, Vice-Chair of the Senate Select Committee, echoed many of the same themes when he responded to an open letter from the chair of the Committee to Protect Journalists, Kati Marton, who had urged a complete ban:

... there are imaginable scenarios where only a member of the press, clergy, or the Peace Corps would have the access necessary to prevent the loss of life. . . . When lives are at risk or vital interests are at risk, I don't see why any American patriot should be forbidden to cooperate with an American intelligence agency.⁵¹

In response, the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) led the effort to insist that ministry and intelligence must remain forever separate. The NAE cited the "danger to missionaries" as well as the "inappropriateness of their representing the United States rather than the Gospel" to demand a total ban on the use of clergy in intelligence work.⁵² In his testimony, NAE President Don Argue said any practice of using clergy, missionaries, or aid workers in intelligence operations had to stop "in order to protect the ministry, safety, and lives of personnel and their families."⁵³ At its 1996 convention, the NAE adopted a resolution entitled "Government Use of Missionary and Aid Workers" which states, in part:

We insist that the CIA close any loophole that allows for intelligence gathering collaboration with clergy, missionaries, and aid workers. We insist that the CIA

50. "The CIA's use of journalists, clergy, and Peace Corps . . .," n. 47.

51. Kate Houghton, "Subverting Journalism: Reporters and the CIA," *Special Report of the Society of Professional Journalists* (1996), posted at <http://www.hr/mproface/ciapress6.html>.

52. "Saying No to Intelligence," *NAE Washington Insight* 17 (April 1996) at <http://www.nae.net/insight/docs/43.html>.

53. "Missionaries and the CIA," *NAE Washington Insight* 18 (September 1996), at <http://www.nae.net/insight/docs/37.html>.

clarify and publish its policy for the protection of United States citizens serving in ministry abroad.⁵⁴

In this debate, two principal issues emerged. The first is whether spying is fundamentally immoral, and thus highly improper for servants of God and faith to be engaged in. The second is whether or not this choice should be left up to individual clerics or religious workers.

Is engaging in intelligence work unethical? Some Muslims, for example, claim that the Koran enjoins faithful Muslims from engaging in espionage: "O believers! Above all hold yourself from suspicion, for even a little suspicion is criminal. Do not spy on one another, or cut down one another, for would anyone from among you desire to eat the flesh of his departed brother? Of course, you would feel horror at this. Fear God: God the Redeemer, the Merciful," (49: 12).⁵⁵ Some Christians believe that, since intelligence work involves deception and lying, it is of diabolical origin, since the devil "was a murderer from the beginning, and has nothing to do with the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks according to his own nature, for he is a liar and the father of lies" (John 8: 43-44).⁵⁶ Moreover, early Christian practice forbade any cleric or church leader from exercising any sort of governmental or military duties.⁵⁷

Even if a missionary is only involved in data collection, and has no connection whatsoever to operations, still, many might be sympathetic to the sentiments of Stephen of Perm, a fourteenth-century mission worker among Finno-Ugric tribes in northern Europe, who said, "Christ sent me not to kill, but to teach; not to torture, but to preach with meekness."⁵⁸ Archbishop John Maguire, chancellor to Cardinal Spellman, also came to oppose any collaboration of the Catholic Church with FBI and CIA operations, believing them to be unseemly, opposition that ultimately cost him appointment as Spellman's successor as Archbishop of New York.⁵⁹

On the other hand, defenders of intelligence point to biblical examples. The LORD commanded Moses to "Send men to spy out the land of Canaan . . . and see what the land is, and whether the people who

54. "Resolution Condemns CIA Collaboration," NAE Press Release, 3 March 1996.

55. *Koran: Perevod s arabskago iazika*, ed. T. S. Sadlukov (Kuwait: Al-Zahraa For Arab Mass Media, 1993), 983-85.

56. Ironically, Jesus' preceding words before this statement include the phrase, "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free," which is inscribed in the foyer of the central building at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

57. Apostolic Canon LXXXIII. Cited by Nikolas Gvosdev, "Byzantine Christianity: Life and the Power of the State," *Eye on the Commonwealth* (Summer 1996): 1.

58. G. P. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind*, vol. II (Belmont, Mass: Nordland, 1975), 240.

59. Cooney, *The American Pope*, 324.

dwell in it are strong or weak, whether they are few or many . . .” (Numbers 13: 2, 18). The prophet Elisha was privy to the plans of the king of Syria, and would inform the king of Israel of his military plans and strategy (2 Kings 6: 8-14). The act of spying itself, therefore, is not evil; it must only be measured against the essential rightness of the overall cause. Commenting on allegations of cooperation between clergy and intelligence agencies, a spokesman for the Russian Orthodox Church, the Very Rev. Vsevolod Chaplin, said:

This commission was created not in order to condemn the incidents of contact with representatives of authority (which possibly had connections to the KGB). Such contacts in and of themselves could be used for both good and evil.⁶⁰

St. Thomas Aquinas can also be used to justify participation in espionage, via the medium of “just war theory.” Quoting Augustine, he noted that “true religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.” If the action is ordered by legitimate authority, to achieve a just cause, and with good intention, it is justified.⁶¹ In speaking about the use of ambushes and deception in warfare, Aquinas said that “such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war. Nor can these ambushes be properly be called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will.”⁶² Therefore, it can be argued, that in certain cases, the use of clergy or missionaries in espionage may be justified in order to prevent a worse evil or catastrophe from occurring.

Since a missionary or aid worker might, in good conscience, feel compelled either to take part in or abstain from cooperation with intelligence operatives, should not this decision best be left up to each individual? Might not an individual identify with the sentiments expressed by Cardinal Spellman, that service to God entails faithful service to one’s country?

Morale means courage, readiness to serve, high purpose. Morals is the sense of right and wrong, divinely taught, which makes a man strong in his duty to God, and morale makes him strong in his duty to country. . . . Religion and patriotism support and strengthen each other.⁶³

60. V. Rev. Vsevolod Chaplin, “Answers of the Patriarchate to ‘Ogonyok’ Questions,” *Ogonyok*, 24 August 1998. Archived at <http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/ce040881.htm>.

61. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Part II, Question 40 (Benzinger Brothers edition, 1947), at <http://ethics/acusd/edu/Texts/Aquinas/JustWar.html>.

62. Ibid.

63. Cooney, *The American Pope*, 129.

Speaking at the July 1996 hearing, Senator Kerrey indicated, "In any event, I don't see why . . . any American patriot should be prohibited from working for their country."⁶⁴ Given the type of threats that are posed to any society today—including the threat of a terrorist group unleashing a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon on a civilian population—it seems not only ludicrous, but even immoral, to suggest that certain groups of people who might be able to stop such a tragedy from occurring would be prevented from offering their assistance.

In analyzing why missionary groups were unequivocal in their opposition to allowing any missionary or aid worker from being used by or even voluntarily working for an intelligence group, Mindy Belz observed: "Missionaries may be sensitive about having their patriotism called into question, but the agencies that sponsor them are unequivocally opposed to any possibility their workers will be hired to spy . . . [A]ccording to NAE's Rich Cizik, 'It's the appearance worldwide that mission agencies, religious workers, clergy, and others are open to being used by the CIA. It's not from our vantage point a special and unique circumstances problem as much as it is an appearance problem.'⁶⁵ In other words, for the sake of ensuring the credibility of the entire profession, no single cleric or missionary or aid worker can be allowed to work for an intelligence service, even as a willing and knowing volunteer. Therefore, intelligence work is prohibited for clerics and church personnel as a matter of employment policy, and is not a decision left up to the individual. Moreover, there is the fear that even one scandal taints all mission work. After the arrest of the three Americans in Zimbabwe, local Christians refused to rally to their support. Andrew Watawunashe, president of Zimbabwe's Evangelical Fellowship, expressed "horror at the abuse of the term *Christian work* by people who have allegedly been involved in illegal arms smuggling."⁶⁶ Individuals who claim to be acting in the name of religion, therefore, have no right to use that identity to cloak other activities, which, however justified they may personally believe them to be, cast aspersions on the work of all churchmen and missionaries.⁶⁷ Moreover, as Senator Paul Coverdell, a former director of the Peace Corps, pointed out at the July 1996 hearings, the existing intelligence community already has so many assets and resources, "exceptions were not necessary."⁶⁸

64. "The CIA's use of journalists, clergy, and Peace Corps . . .," n. 47.

65. Belz, "Missionary: possible," n. 43.

66. Okite, "Missionaries," 28.

67. This was the same argument advanced by Morton Zuckerman, the publisher of *U. S. News and World Report*, with regard to journalists. "It is not an individual decision if the journalist is witting. It affects all the press." "The CIA's use of journalists, clergy, and Peace Corps . . .," n. 47.

68. *Ibid.*

In a society that values freedom of religion and promotes the separation of church and state, is it permissible for the state to seek assistance from or cloak its activities in religion? Since there has been no specific legal challenge to either the constitutionality of the general prohibition of recruiting priests and clergymen as agents or the waiver process by which the prohibition may be circumvented, there is no immediate answer. In the *Abington School District vs. Schempp* decision, the majority of the Supreme Court reiterated its support for the principle upheld in the earlier *Everson* decision, that the First Amendment was designed "to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority."⁶⁹ Such sentiments might be used to support a complete ban on using clerics as government agents. On the other hand, supporters of the current system—that, under certain circumstances, it might be necessary, for national security, to allow ministers and pastors to cooperate with intelligence agencies—might find support in other Supreme Court decisions which seem to place limits on the ability of religious organizations to claim exemption from state policies on the grounds of the separation of church and state. Justice Powell noted, "It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation, and as a consequence cases arising under these Clauses have presented some of the most perplexing questions to come before this Court."⁷⁰ In *Cantwell vs. Connecticut*, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion consisted both of the freedom to believe and the freedom to act on such beliefs, but noted, "The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."⁷¹ Thus, in certain cases, requiring that recruiting clerics violate the separation of church and state could potentially be justified under crisis or emergency conditions.⁷²

69. *Abington School District vs. Schempp*, 374 U. S. 203, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560; 10 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1963).

70. *Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty vs. Nyquist*, 413 U. S. 756, 93 Sup. Ct. 2955; 37 L. Ed. 2d 948 (1973).

71. *Cantwell vs. Connecticut*, 310 U. S. 296; 60 Sup. Ct. 900; 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).

72. It is also unclear how the Court might rule, if such a case were brought, with regard to U. S. government funds being used to support religious institutions through the funding of "sectarian" programs or the construction of facilities. Would CIA support of a religious radio station, for example, violate the principle in *Tilton vs. Richardson*, 403 U.S. 672 (1970) that federal monies may not be used to construct facilities used for secular purposes if, at a later date, the facility is turned over for religious use? Does the fact that religious and missionary groups are sectarian-based automatically disqualify the government from cooperating with them? The Court majority in the *Bowen vs. Kendrick* decision in 1988 "clarified that a finding of simple religious affiliation or inspiration is not enough to characterize a social service provider as pervasively sectarian." Abigail Lawlis Kuzma, "Faith-Based Providers Partnering with Government: Opportunity and Temptation," *Journal of Church and*

IS THE GENIE OUT OF THE BOTTLE?

Whenever revelations about the collaboration—or possible cooperation—between churches and intelligence agencies have been made public, the inevitable question arises: is it possible to reverse the damage done to the reputations of clergy, missionaries, and aid workers? When journalists and clergy converged on Capitol Hill in July 1996, they were unanimous in their assertion that even allowing for exceptions to the rule prohibiting general recruitment of journalists and clergy as agents placed all journalists and clergy at risk of being accused of being espionage agents. Terry Anderson, the AP reporter who himself was held hostage in Lebanon from 1986 to 1991, testified, “The damage has already been done by Mr. Deutsch’s admission that it had been done. It must be prohibited.” Likewise, Ted Koppel (ABC News) said that it did not matter that DCI Deutsch had said that he had, as of yet, not issued any waivers authorizing recruitment of reporters or ministers, because, “How often the waiver is actually used is irrelevant. It is how it is assumed to be used.”⁷³ Despite assurances that such waivers are rarely granted, the fact that a procedure exists to permit the recruitment of clerics and missionaries leads to increased suspicion directed against all religious workers.

How perceptions in this matter can easily be shaped and distorted was demonstrated by the reaction to DCI Deutsch’s July 1996 testimony in Yugoslavia. A leading Belgrade newspaper commented:

Several days ago, our newspaper also published TANJUG’s report on John Deutsch, director of the CIA, who said “that no American will be exempt from the obligation to work for the CIA when it comes to protecting U. S. institutions, interests, and lives (!)” Mr. Deutsch particularly appealed to reporters, priests, missionaries, peace activists, and humanitarians. We naively wanted to believe that these honorable professions were the institutions of a democratic and humane society. But “no way”: These institutions are there to protect the administration’s powerful, underground, and predominantly hostile institution called the CIA! So, whenever the pious missionary or reverend father listens to a holy and secret confession and hears something that might be interesting, he must run to Deutsch. . . .⁷⁴

Even though Deutsch had said in his testimony that he preferred not to use clergy in intelligence operations, the fact that he had not ruled out any potential use of religious personnel was reinterpreted to mean an affirmation of the willingness and desire of American intelligence agencies to recruit such people for espionage work. This leads to a vicious

State 42 (Winter 2000): 52. While one might argue that the CIA’s charter empowers the agency only to operate outside the United States, counter-intelligence operations of the FBI can be launched domestically.

73. “The CIA’s use of journalists, clergy, and Peace Corps . . .,” n. 47.

74. Andjeloko Dragojevic, “The CIA is No Cheap skate,” *Vecernje Novosti*, 30 July 1996, 2.

circle: intelligence agencies refuse to enact a total ban on the use of religious workers, claiming the need for exceptions. In turn, governments feel that they have legitimate grounds to suspect missionaries and church workers of being agents.⁷⁵ Therefore, some agencies maintain that since missionaries and others are already compromised, there is no harm in then recruiting them for intelligence operations.

Two examples, both within a short time of Deutsch's testimony, confirm this. One month after the hearing, North Korean authorities arrested Evan C. Hunziker, an American missionary who had attempted to enter the country from China, and held him on charges of espionage for three months.⁷⁶ Mission work is still suspect as cover for espionage, despite assurances to the contrary. The following year, a report issued by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty indicated that, eight years after the Velvet Revolution which brought down Communist rule in Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS), itself moving closer to Russian intelligence, was reviving Cold War-era practices, including surveillance of religious figures and attempting to reactivate an intelligence unit within the Catholic Church.⁷⁷ Thus, the issue of church involvement in espionage activities is far from being settled.

One solution might be crafted, based on a proposal advanced by Ted Koppel in 1996. Responding to comments that, in certain extreme cases, it might be justified to use journalists as spies, Koppel noted: "When an intelligence official breaks U. S. laws, if their argument is persuasive, Congress can be lenient. If the CIA must use journalists it will do so, but it should have to be breaking the law in so doing."⁷⁸ Enacting a total ban into law might help to remove any taint of collaboration between missionaries and aid workers and American intelligence agencies. Having to justify the use of prohibited personnel in front of a Congressional committee or a court of law might also force the intelligence community to truly re-evaluate whether a situation could really be judged an emergency or an overwhelming threat to national security so as to justify the use of clerics in a particular operation. Religious organizations might also enact strict regulations forbidding their ministers and employees from cooperating with intelligence services, under

75. Commenting on this, Terry Anderson, the former hostage, said, "If there is an exception, no matter how well hedged, it would confirm their belief [that journalists, clergy, and others were probably CIA employees]." "The CIA's use of journalists, clergy, and Peace Corps . . .," n. 47.

76. "Mission-minded American Found Dead," *Religious News Service*, 18 December 1996.

77. Jolyon Naegele, "Slovakia: Intelligence Service Reverts to Communist-Era Practices," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Features*, May 1997, on-line at <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/F.RU.970529133316.html>.

78. "The CIA's use of journalists, clergy, and Peace Corps . . .," n. 47.

pain of deposition or termination of ministry, unless able to provide to a duly-constituted board or other authority good and sufficient cause. It is not clear, for example, that religious organizations have ever taken serious steps against missionaries or aid workers in their employ who have collaborated with intelligence services. Such steps, taken openly and publicly, might go a long way in helping to diffuse the charges of spying and espionage often leveled against clergy and other church workers.

On the other hand, such forthcoming reassurances are unlikely. In 1996, both Senator Kerrey and DCI Deutsch expressed their deep unease and discomfort at having any public discussion on the sources and methods of intelligence.⁷⁹ There is a strong presumption in intelligence circles that any discussion of intelligence operations, and especially any announced limitations on espionage activities, might embolden a nation's enemies.⁸⁰ Religious organizations may also be unwilling to interfere in what might be viewed as an individual act of conscience or something viewed as supporting the overall goals of the religious movement⁸¹ (although one would expect that spying for crass material gain might be something for which religious groups would more readily discipline their pastors and volunteer workers). However, this question may soon be rendered academic. An accelerating trend today is for missionaries, teachers, and aid workers to be drawn from the indigenous population. The organization "Christian Aid" estimates that less than 10 percent of missionaries are drawn from the United States, with most being "natives of other countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe." It sees this trend as positive, since Indigenous missionaries already know the language and customs of their people. Their message is more readily accepted because they are not outsiders. Foreign-

79. Ibid.

80. See, for example, the meeting between President-elect Reagan and Colonel Alexandre de Marenches in 1980, public comments on disinformation campaigns against Libya in 1985, or the question of publication of information on intelligence capabilities. Woodward, *Veil*, 20-22, 524, 551.

81. At the forum on cooperation between Orthodox leaders and the KGB (22 March 1992, at St. John the Baptist Russian Orthodox Church, Washington, D. C.), the question-and-answer period generated a great deal of discussion on whether there in fact is a moral distinction to be made for spying for a totalitarian power versus rendering aid to the intelligence service of a democratic state. Some defended the actions of the hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate on the grounds of patriotism, that it is a positive duty to render help and aid to one's country. Others, while strongly critical of the actions of the Russian hierarchs, justified the collaboration of American clergy with American intelligence since the United States defended religious freedom and working with the American government was helping to advance the global cause of freedom. There was no agreement as to when cooperation with intelligence agencies violated religious norms; this would therefore make the creation of any binding criteria regarding cooperation difficult, unless a religious group was prepared to enforce either a total ban or leave the decision up to individuals.

ers are regarded with suspicion. Americans missionaries are often thought to be spies sent by the CIA or business interests.⁸²

Even if the number of American mission workers is dropping, governments and churches should nonetheless carefully consider all the implications of this question. Allowing the state to recruit agents from within religious organizations carries with it the potential to erode church-state separation from within, by giving the government the ability to control agents within a religious establishment. It raises questions about whether a church worker should place his or her loyalty to faith over country, and whether, for the principle of church-state separation, the state should potentially place its national interests at risk. It has implications for questions of international religious liberty, because leaving the relationship between missionaries and intelligence agencies ambiguous can compromise efforts to secure full freedom for religious groups to preach, spread their message, and seek converts. Given the number of other areas where the church-state relationship in the United States has been so carefully and minutely charted, it is time for such a process to be carried over into intelligence matters.

82. "The New Focus in Foreign Missions," posted on the "Christian Aid" website, 30 September 1999, at <http://www.christianaid.org/indig.htm>.